ABSTRACT

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the reasons for movement formation, or the movement's interaction
with power agents, Sartre bases his analysis on the forms of
organization within the group. The paper then reviews the five forms
of groups discussed by Sartre--the series, the fused group, the
pledged group, the organization, and the institution--and describes
the functions of rhetoric particular to each form. (Author/FL)

RHETORIC IN GROUP ACTION: A THEORY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

FROM JEAN-PAUL SARTRE

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Abstract

This study examines the implications of a social movement theory
advanced by Jean-Paul Sartre in his Critique of Dialectical Reason.
Unlike sociologists and rhetoricians who have stressed the psychology of
movement adherents, the reasons for movement formation, or the movement's
interaction with power agents, Sartre bases his analysis on the forms of
organization within the group. Sartre discusses five forms of groups--the
series, the fused group, the pledged group, the organization and the insti-
tution. He describes the functions of rhetoric particular to each form,
thereby providing a typology valuable to the movement critic.

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In an assessment of social movement research in the mid-1950s, Herbert Blumer observed that, while there had been much study of the causes of movements, of the interaction of movements with power agents, and of the personality structure of movement adherents, other areas of movement study had received little attention.[1] Traditional cause-effect research of the type described by Blumer focuses on the factors in society and in the psychological makeup of the individual which lead to movement formation and participation. The purpose of this cause-effect research is to isolate those aspects of the situation which could serve as predictors of future movement activity. The disadvantage of this type of analysis is that it focuses on factors leading to the movement's formation and its exterior influence rather than on the interior processes of group activity. Blumer claimed that more analysis of the processes by which groups are formed and maintained was needed.[2]

In a recent study, Ralph R. Smith and Russel R. Windes observed that increased focus on intragroup processes would lead to progress toward a definition of movement useful to the rhetorical critic. Smith and Windes drew an important distinction between motivational exigencies, problems or strains which provide a reason for the movement's formation and development, and mobilizational exigencies by which movements generate appeals designed to integrate and mobilize movement adherents.[3] They further claimed that discourse aimed at organizing and sustaining the movement should not be ignored by the rhetorical critic.

Since the rhetorician is interested in persuasion, which in a movement is directed toward creating and defending organization, the student

of movement discourse must examine messages which influence attitudes toward organization. The relevant distinction lies between specialists in organizational communication concerned with the exchange of messages for routine maintenance of established institutions, and specialists in movement rhetoric concerned with messages for the building of organizations.[4]

I believe that Smith and Windes have isolated an important area of study for the movement critic. They urge further study, not only of motivational appeals and of the influence of the movement on the larger society, but also of the process by which the movement becomes organized and achieves internal integration. A theory of movements which distinguishes between types of movements by determining the extent to which the movement is organized or is susceptible to mobilizational appeals would be useful.

The study which follows will examine a social movement theory which emphasizes intragroup processes in movement formation and development. This theory was advanced by Jean-Paul Sartre in his recently-translated Critique of Dialectical Reason.[5] Sartre's analysis of factors influencing group development and sustenance will advance our understanding of how rhetoric functions to these ends in social movements. Sartre focuses particularly on invitational rhetoric wherein a commonly-perceived problem leads to social protest and brings about group cohesiveness. He also traces the influence of confirmatory rhetoric which reinforces members and ensures continuance of the group. He does not extensively examine assertive rhetoric whereby the movement attempts to influence power agents and bring about change. Rather, he assumes that movements which succeed will become transformed into organizations or institutions. This attempt to examine the various roles of rhetoric in movement development should be valuable to the rhetorical critic.

The Critique is fundamentally concerned with the ways in which human action

arises in the group and the means by which groups become structured and organized. It is important to note here that when Sartre uses the term "group" he is referring to a large group.[6] Most large, amorphous movements include such groups as subsets. Bus protests, sit-ins, and marches form an important part of movement activity and the entire membership of some localized movements comprises a "large group" in the Sartrean sense. Most of Sartre's observations of group interaction should therefore be applicable to movements as well.

There are, according to Sartre, five ways in which a collection of individuals can experience and respond to a common object--the series, the fused group, the pledged group, the organization, and the institution. The function of discourse in the movement varies with the type of group and the ways in which it seeks to operationalize its ends. The remainder of this study will describe the five group types and the function of rhetoric in each type.

The movement analyst who wishes to apply this theory to movement discourse should be aware of one important consideration. Unlike many sociologists who have studied movement development, Sartre does not propose a movement life cycle.[6] His treatment is nevertheless developmental. Sartre believes that group action develops in a progressive-regressive spiral wherein the same group can form at one stage, digress to another, and dissolve into seriality, only to reappear in another form. Sartre describes the five groups in the order listed above simply to facilitate comprehensiveness by the reader. At one point Sartre digresses from his account to remark, "This is not a matter of genesis. . . . It could be done the other way round. This order is not untrue, but the reverse order is is possible. I am adopting it because it leads from the simple to the complex, and from the abstract to the concrete." (p. 411) The important point to note here is that movement from one group form to another is not unidirectional, and in many cases it may not be predictable.

The Serial Collective and
Alienating Discourse

The absence of group activity is evidenced in "the series," which is a collection of individuals experiencing a common object passively. Sartre labels the phenomenon arising in this situation "alterity." Alterity is a relation of separation, the experiencing of the Other as Other. Sartre's well-known example of this is a group of individuals waiting for a bus which provides a common object without group reciprocity. "From this point of view," Sartre observes, "the group is not structured, . . . the individuals are considered as arbitrary particles and they are not collected together as the result of any common dialectical process." (p. 262) Thus each individual experiences the common object (the bus) in isolation and encounters the alienation of alterity.

The salient distinguishing feature of the series is its passivity. It receives nothing from the outside and contributes nothing to its own genesis and design. The only vehicle for reciprocity among individuals in a serial collective is the preexisting material and cultural milieu, termed the "practico-inert" by Sartre.[7] There is no interaction among the individuals because, as Sartre observes, "we are concerned here with a plurality of isolations: these people do not care about or speak to each other and . . . exist side by side alongside a bus stop." (p. 256) There is no common objective for group action, so each individual experiences the collective passively and in isolation.

Within the constraints of the series and its resulting alterity, discourse serves an alienating function. It becomes the common object without providing a common objective. Language affirms the reality of the isolating collective. Discourse is "a practico-inert designation of the practico-inert field. . . . a passive activity in the milieu of alterity . . . acting on the individual as

he acts and speaks as other in the milieu of serial impotence." (pp. 304-05) This alienating function of discourse is described at length in Sartre's example of the radio broadcast, to which the lone listener cannot respond in concert with others and where there is little or no opportunity for direct feedback to the message source. Each individual in this serial audience experiences the discourse passively, (in isolation, and from the point of view of others. If the listener witnesses a political broadcast to which he experiences a strong negative reaction, for example, his reaction is due to the awareness that others are listening and may be influenced whereas he is not. He experiences impotence and frustration, and is in no way able to directly take action against the effects of discourse. The message is alienating and is endured in passivity.

Public opinion has this element to it. Everyone perceives and accepts ideas via public opinion from the other who believes it as Other. "At this level, the Idea is a process; it derives its invincible strength from the fact that nobody thinks it." (p. 300) Rather than being a result of the individual's conscious or intentional activity, the ideas transmitted via public opinion are a part of the practico-inert. They are defined as self-evident and are not subject to verification by the individual. Public opinion does not result from an individual's praxis and is characterized by his inability to transform it.[8] Like the radio broadcast, it is a vehicle of alterity and at times intensifies the individual's feelings of isolation and helplessness.

In the series there can be no rhetoric as such because there is no common action or purpose providing opportunities for discourse. The rhetor who addresses the series will succeed only insofar as he is able to create an exigence and articulate the positive effects of group formation.[9] If he is addressing an

audience over the mass media, he has particular problems in this regard. As

Karlyn Kohrs Campbell stated in examining this problem,

> If the nature of the series precludes the possibility of group action,
> then rhetorical discourse directed toward the series must attempt to
> change the relations among the members. Whether any discourse transmitted
> via the mass media can overcome the intrinsic seriality of the media
> themselves is a provocative and significant question for contemporary
> rhetorical theory.[10]

In examining the effects of discourse on the series, the movement critic, in

particular, would probably view the series as a latent group and would investi-

gate the rhetor's potential for bringing about group action and transforming

a serial collective into a movement. If he succeeds, the results of his

action will be the formation of the fused group, the pledged group, the

organization or the institution, the four forms of groups to which we now turn.

The Fused Group: Discourse as Incidental

When a collection of individuals becomes a group, according to Sartre, it

experiences a common need and a commonly-perceived danger. The individual

members' ends are transcended by the common experience and objectives of the

group, and the alterity of the serial collective disappears with the appearance

of group reciprocity. Reciprocal relations involve an internal realization on

the part of each member of the experience of the others, and this is essential

to group experience. As Sartre observes, "neither common need, nor common

praxis, nor common objectives can define a community unless it makes itself into

a community by feeling the individual need as common need, and by projecting

itself, in the internal unification of a common integration, towards objectives

that it produces as common." (p. 350)

The first type of group described by Sartre, the fused group, emerges when a collection of individuals simultaneously perceives some immediate threat and engages in a common but unstructured and unpredicted reaction. Sartre's example of the praxis of a fused group is the storming of the Bastille. Believing that the government's troops would soon arrive and begin flushing citizens from their homes, the populace gathered in the streets. Unpredictably, they armed themselves and performed in concert. By Sartre's definition, this group possessed all the characteristics of a fused group, being structureless, leaderless, mutually imitative, short-lived, and possessing initially an unclear objective.[11] In the fused group, "the reality of praxis . . . depends on the liquidation of the serial, both in everyone and by everyone in everyone, and its replacement by community." (p. 387)

The movement critic studying the fused group as a stage of movement development would have difficulty identifying individual rhetors in this situation if Sartre's theory is correct. In the fused group the individual rhetor is merely "a third party," that is, he is a human mediator for group action but not a recognized leader. He is at once a constitutor of the group (an exterior observer, an outside force) and is constituted by the group.[12] Each member of a fused group is a third party for every other member. Commands and orders circulate among group members and are more an emergent result of group action than a catalyst for it. In the example of the Bastille, the individual was fleeing because everyone else was fleeing, and shouts "stop" because stopping and giving the order to stop "are identical in that the action develops in him and in everyone through the imperative organisation of its moments." (p. 371) The speaker becomes what Sartre calls a "regulatory third party," transcending the group and then being reabsorbed by it. His individual discourse is superfluous in that anyone might have spoken and, in fact, would

have if he had not. In Sartre's example of the storming of the Bastille, for instance,

> .... the first person to have got himself heard .... was probably the one who happened to be close to a bench or a chair and who could therefore get higher than the others ... establishing a dialectical relationship with the crowd and then being reabsorbed by it and reintegrated by the speeches of some other orator emerging a little further on. At this level there is no longer any leader. In other words, the crowd in situation produces and dissolves within itself its own temporary leaders, the regulatory third parties. (p. 382)

Since each member of the group is a third for every other, the fused group is human mediation. Sartre points out that when the members of a fused group are later questioned about the origin of commands, they often cannot recall who the originator of the discourse was. If they can identify him, they will not reveal his identity. This is because they feel responsible as a group; everyone as an individual and as a member (i.e., as a third party) actualized the common objective which was merely articulated and not originated by the speaker. Discourse in the fused group, therefore, may foster and promote group praxis but does not initiate or control it.

The Pledged Group: Discourse as Confirmatory

The fused group which was formed spontaneously in response to some immanent danger, is a short-lived phenomenon. Once the danger has passed or, at least, has receded into the distance, the fused group changes in character. It consummates its action and then either disperses or ossifies into a permanent group characterized by inertia. (p. 407) When the urgency of the situation decreases, group members become concerned with another problem--perpetuation of the group itself. Suspicion arises within the group along with interpersonal antagonism

and, as Sartre observed, "the possibility of free secession manifests itself . . .
for every individual praxis; and this possibility reveals itself in every other
third party as the same in so far as this particular third party, here, reveals
it in them" (p. 419) At this point, group members may adopt a statute which
Sartre calls a "pledge" (serment).

The pledge often, but not always, exists in symbolic form. "Pledges can
take very different forms, from the explicit act of swearing an oath to the
implicit assumption of a pledge as the already existing reality of the group." (p. 419)
The pledge serves a number of functions. It binds every group member to a reci-
procal commitment mediated by everyone as a third party. The individual offers
himself so that everyone can offer themselves. There is a totalisation of
pledges which constitutes a negative limit to each individual's action. The
individual pledges that he will not withdraw from the group, impede its action,
or betray it in any way. There exists "a set of reciprocal and individual
obligations, defined by the whole group on the basis of circumstances and
objectives which bind the individual." (p. 437) By means of the pledge, the
group preserves itself against the seriality which threatens to dissolve it
and guarantees to each of its members that the other members will never become
other in alterity.

Whereas in the fused group discourse was incidental to the common praxis,
in the pledged group discourse gives the group its reality and ensures its
continuing existence. The pledge substitutes a real fear, produced by the
group itself, for the retreating external fear which caused it to be formed in
the first place. The pledge creates an internal exigence which guarantees
continuance of the group. As Sartre observes, "The group as an action upon
itself . . . can only be coercive. . . . The aim is . . . to protect the
common interest. But in the absence of any [external] pressure, the group

must produce itself as an action upon its members." (p. 430) The pledge, then, assumes power; it is an absolute right over every individual and limits the freedom of each. In assuring the future of the group as a whole, the pledge eliminates certain future possibilities for each individual.

In the pledged group, rhetoric functions to keep their vow ever present to the group members. The pledge puts forward the right of life or death (real or symbolic) over everyone in the group; even in betraying the group, the individual remains subject to the pledge and thus a member of the group. He becomes the object of the group's violence but cannot extricate himself from the group. (p. 438) The rhetor's function, then, is to promote this fear and use it to undermine the individual antagonisms which reemerge as external pressure on the group lessens. The rhetor recreates the pledge and warns members of the consequences of betraying the group. The purpose of his rhetoric is to promote members' fears of dissolution, thereby producing an internal pressure which holds the group together.

The Organized Group and
Regulatory Discourse

Man's dialectical interaction with his material environment is clearly shown in the organized group. Whereas the fused group arose in common, spontaneous action and the pledged group was characterized by inertia, the organized group provides each individual with a specific, concrete task which has been determined by the group. Each member's status in the group is determined by the extent to which his individual action contributes to the common goal. The task provides structure for the group, as well as the limits and potential of each individual's freedom to act.

The central characteristic of the organized group, then, is the function which the group assigns to each of its members. Function is a positive definition of

the common individual and a determination of individual praxis. The individual interiorizes the multiplicity of other third parties and unifies the multiplicity through his action which is structured by the group objective.[13] The member therefore becomes an integral part of the group by and through his task.

Since for each individual his task gives the group its structure, "every function . . . defines itself . . . positively as the action which makes individual action both possible and necessary. At the level of the organisation, being-in-the-group is no longer . . . abstract; it is the organised relation which unifies each member to each and all." (p. 466)

In the organized group, discourse operates as a regulatory promoter of individual and group action. Through discourse, the group defines, directs, controls, and corrects its praxis. Sartre states that "at this level, discourse is practical and concrete: it is used to give orders or to name everyone's respective function." (p. 469) Although Sartre seems concerned primarily with the function of discourse as regulator, he points out that the discourse itself is influenced by members in a dialectical process. Discourse "temporalises itself only in reciprocity, that is to say, it must also be adopted and interiorised by the individual." (p. 496) The action of the individual, channeled and inspired by discourse, becomes an expression both of the multiplicity of the group and of his own freedom to act. Discourse in the organized group gives structure and purpose to the actions of the members and at the same time is influenced by their reactions.

The rhetor/leader in the organized group can be either a symbolic leader or a directorial leader. The symbolic leader serves as a rallying point for members in times of crisis. He inspires devotion in group members and confirms the power of the group. He does not give orders or actually direct the group but merely serves as a human mediator, a means by which individual members can

identify with the group. Sartre calls this form of the third party the "organizer-agitator."

Two factors differentiate the directorial leader from the organizer-agitator. The first is the coercive nature of the leader's power--his ability to give commands and to be obeyed. The second is the number of mediations which separate him from the group--the extent to which he transcends group action as opposed to the extent to which he is a part of it. (p. 524) In the organized group, the leader actualizes the common praxis by giving orders and commands. His voice of command, however, is the voice of a common individual who seeks to complete a concrete task which has been initiated and defined by the group members. The leader does not dictate the group task but furnishes the means by which it can be accomplished, all the while remaining a part of the group.

The Institution and Realienation

Sartre posits a fifth group, the institution, which possesses few of the characteristics of a movement and appears as a degraded form of the organization. No longer is there a common action mediated by each individual as a third party. In fact, there is often no commonly understood purpose for group action. "As praxis [the institution's] teleological meaning can be come obscured; but this is either because the institution is a mere carcass or because those who are institutionalized have a real comprehension of its aim but cannot or will not communicate it." (p. 600) The group goal, when it exists, may be to influence other groups or to alter the framework of the group's action, but it is always more distant from the individual member and more difficult to discern than in the organized group.

In the institutionalized group the phenomena of seriality and passive inertia reemerge. The individual feels that he is inessential in relation to his function,

and that the institution is a massive entity which would continue without him were he to leave it. He is separated from other group members and cannot predict their reaction to change. The individual's experience is marked by alterity and the structure of the institution is imposed from without. The source of this structure is the "sovereign," a group leader whose power is based negatively on the impossibility of every third party becoming regulatory. The power of the institution over its members is based on the sovereign's ability to maintain individual separation and serial alterity. (p. 603) "Everyone obeys in seriality: not because he directly adopts an attitude of obedience, but because he is not sure whether his neighbor has undertaken to obey." (p. 630)

An example of the institutionalized group is the large corporation wherein the lower-echelon employee often has no clear sense of the corporation's purpose which remains unarticulated and ill-defined. Sartre cites the example of the production worker whose actions are ruled by machinery rather than by other men and who does not feel himself to be a part of the group, at least as far as the institution itself is concerned. (pp. 186-89) The psychological need to be an essential part of a group task has, to some extent, given rise to the union movement and its ideology.

The sovereign's efforts to inhibit reciprocal group communication in an institutionalized group are successful to the extent that the threshold of communication between third parties is raised. In describing the sovereign's role in intragroup communication, Sartre observes: "Every practical initiative, every attempt at reorganisation, every invention and discovery [does not have to] originate in the sovereign but must pass through him, be reinteriorised by him, and, through him, appear to the group as a new practical orientation. . . . The function of the sovereign is to . . . . constitute himself as a permanent mediation

between the common individuals." (pp. 613-14) Sartre goes on to point out that it is only through manipulation of the means of communication that the sovereign is able to do this. Under the conditions which arise when the group leader is the sole mediator of discourse, communication within the group can always be broken. This is accomplished by impeding reciprocity among group members.

Inhibition of communication leads to mistrust among members, to ambiguity concerning how others are reacting, and to fear of group sanction or ostracism if one proposes a new direction for the group when he has not been invited to do so.

> Thus I do not dare to make a proposal or, if I do make one, my proposition will elicit no response. . . . It is impossible for me to estimate how my regulatory action will appear to [the others], that is to say, I do not know with what alterity it will be affected: it will be deformed and diverted, and there is danger that it will bring about results quite contrary to those I intended. . . . And this very concrete reason always tends to plunge me even deeper into silence. (p. 603)

The negative manipulation of opportunities for communication, then, is essential to maintenance of the institutionalized group. The sovereign, as mediator of intragroup discourse, filters communication in such a way that he remains the hub of group activity, controls the common praxis, and preserves his status as group leader.

Conclusion

In his description of the group process, Sartre discusses the varying functions of discourse in different groups. Rhetoric addressed to the series or the institutionalized group succeeds to the extent that it reaches the individual in isolation and convinces him that he should be persuaded because others are. If discourse addressed to such a group can inhibit communication between its listeners while leading them to believe that it is succeeding with everyone else, it will accomplish its purpose.

Conversely, the rhetor who seeks to form an organized group from a series or an institution will be successful if he can articulate a preexisting common praxis or common objective in a crisis situation. The potential group members must perceive an immanent danger or an immediate and significant task to be done. Since these are the factors which bring about the fused group and the organization and give them their structure, the rhetor cannot supply them, he can only articulate, foster, or promote them. Studies using Sartre's analysis of the structure and functioning of the fused and organized group versus the serial and institutionalized group would help us to understand how the rhetor creates the former from the latter.

While Sartre's analysis is not strictly developmental, it clearly describes group process from a developmental perspective. The organization is formed from the series or the fused or pledged group. Therefore organized groups, wherein each member identifies with a task contributing to the common objective, should emerge near the end of the movement life cycle. The institutionalized group, however, can result from any of the other groups—fused, pledged, or organized. Sartre clearly states that institutionalization occurs whenever a certain individual within the group accumulates sufficient power to become a sovereign. (p. 626) Institutionalization, the destruction of inter-individual identity with the common task, should mark the end of effective action by movement members. An interesting area of investigation for the rhetorical critic would be to isolate the aspects of discourse which differentiate the rhetoric of the organizational leader from that of the institutional sovereign.

The Critique's description of intragroup processes should also lead us to consider how discourse functions to create, maintain, and sometimes destroy the internal structure of larger groups. The extent to which communication comes

to be channeled through a group leader or sovereign is important in determining whether or not the group has a hierarchical structure. Another productive area of analysis for the rhetorical critic would be to study how discourse functions to promote reciprocity and how it is used to impede communication and inhibit reciprocity.

Sartre's exhaustive study of group development and praxis outlines the nature of varying types of groups and the role of discourse within each of them. It describes the nature of groups in relation to their purpose, their internal structure, and the functions of their leadership. In its generic classification of groups and in its focus on the internal processes of group formation and maintenance, it explores areas which need greater attention from sociologists and rhetoricians. The latter group can utilize the Critique as a theoretical tool in analyzing the invitational and confirmatory rhetoric of various movement types.

NOTES

[1] Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior," in Review of Sociology: Analysis of a Decade, ed. Joseph B. Gittler (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1957), p. 151.

[2] Ibid., pp. 146-51.

[3] Ralph R. Smith and Russel R. Windes, "The Rhetoric of Mobilization: Implications for the Study of Movements," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 42 (1976), 2.

[4] Ibid., p. 6.

[5] Jean-Paul Sartre, Critique of Dialectical Reason, trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith, ed. Jonathan Rée (London: NLB, 1976). The remaining citations of this work will be by page number and included in the text. There can be little doubt that the Critique is a significant philosophical and anthropological work. R. D. Laing and D. G. Cooper, in Reason and Violence (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), p. 27, stated that if the project of the Critique succeeds, Sartre "will be the prime mover of one of the greatest syncretic revolutions in human thought." Theirs is one of two major works in English based on the Critique which appeared before it was translated, the other being Wilfrid Desan, The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1965). Michel Contat and Michel Rybalka, in The Writings of Jean-Paul Sartre (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 372, call the Critique "the major work of the 'second Sartre'" and deplore the inadequate attention given to it by contemporary sociologists and anthropologists. I shall also observe here that no rhetorician has published any treatment of this work, although Karlyn Kohrs Campbell did devote a chapter of her dissertation to it (cited below).

[6]Leland M. Griffin, "The Rhetoric of Historical Movements," QJS, 38 (1952), 185-90, offers a three-stage model, including a "period of inception," a "period of crisis," and a "period of consummation." Hans Toch perceives the movement's cycle in terms of its progressive impact on the individual in his The Social Psychology of Social Movements (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1965). Bowers and Ochs define the movement life cycle in terms of escalating rhetorical activities, including periods of "petition," "promulgation," "solidification," "polarization," "nonviolent resistance," "confrontation," "guerrilla activity," and "revolution." See John Waite Bowers and Donovan J. Ochs, The Rhetoric of Agitation and Control (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., 1971).

[7]Two central terms used in the Critique are "praxis" which refers to all purposeful and meaningful human activity and "practico-inert" which refers to those aspects of man's environment in which past praxis is embodied. Sartre calls the practico-inert "worked-over matter" and includes within it laws, traditions, language, and culture. Sartre describes a constant dialectical tension between praxis and the practico-inert; with the former, man acts on matter and influences and changes his world, while the latter constrains man's praxis. In speech, for example, discourse and rhetoric are praxis, a means by which man acts on his world, while the language which he speaks, the practico-inert or "worked-over matter," limits his choices and constrains his discourse even as he speaks. These two terms are discussed further in Sartre's Search for a Method, trans. and ed. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. xvi; and his Between Existentialism and Marxism, trans. John Mathews (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1974), pp. 52-55.

[8]Sartre's description of public opinion and the individual's passivity

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in relation to it seems quite similar to Martin Heidegger's discussion of "idle talk" and "passing-the-word-along." Of these phenomena Heidegger says "what is said-in-the-talk, as such, spreads in wider circles and takes on an authorita-tive character. Things are so because one says so. . . . What is said-in-the-talk gets understood; but what the talk is about is understood only approximately and superficially. . . . Idle talk is constituted by . . . . a process by which its initial lack of grounds to stand on becomes aggravated to complete ground-lessness." See Heidegger's *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 212.

[9]Smith and Windes (p. 4) observe that to some extent movement studies include single speaker studies. "If appeals to integrate action are examined . . . . mobilizational exigencies are crucial and movement rhetoric is under scrutiny. Analysis of a single speaker could, in this sense, constitute a movement study to the extent that critical focus is on appeals which create favorable attitudes toward organized collective action."

[10]Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, "The Rhetorical Implications of the Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre," Diss. University of Minnesota, 1968, pp. 238-39.

[11]Smith and Windes (pp. 7-8) also note the short-lived character of the fused group. "Many situations do not generate exigencies of mobilization since action is integrated spontaneously. . . . Brief-lived collective effort at social change such as mob behavior occurs in response to situations perceived as amenable to change through spasms of frenetic activity. . . . As popular effort continues, coordination of the activities of a large number of participants within an organizational structure becomes necessary."

[12]Laing and Cooper refer to Sartre's concept of the third party as the process of "rudimentary group synthesis [which] brackets . . . human beings together. I bracket you and him together--I perceive you and him together . . . and I think of you and him together as You or Them. 'You' or 'Them' is now a social entity, a social gestalt, that I have constituted as such for me by making one social whole out of two singular individuals. One and one make one." (Reason and Violence, p. 12). This constituting of individuals into a group by a regulatory third party is a totalization.

[13]The term "interiorize" is used by Sartre to refer to the process of making an external phenomenon a part of the individual's inner experience. The assassination of a President, for example, becomes an inherent part of each citizen's inner experience, even though it is an external event. It is therefore "interiorized" by the individual.